Quick commerce has moved from novelty to default buying behaviour in urban India. As of FY 2024, India’s Q‑commerce market is already in the USD 3–7 billion GMV range and is expected to grow ~35–40% annually till 2030, led by players like Blinkit, Zepto, Swiggy Instamart, BB Now and Flipkart Minutes. In many top metros, 10–30 minute delivery has become the new “kirana round the corner” for affluent, time‑poor consumers.
From the outside, Q‑commerce looks simple:
Get listed → Get visibility → Get sales.
From the inside, it’s very different.
At BrandPort, we see many brands enter Q‑commerce quickly but only a small percentage build consistent, profitable scale. The rest struggle with invisibility, margin erosion, and operational chaos.
The issue is not demand.
The issue is how brands approach the channel.
POV #1: Q-commerce Is Not a Channel Extension, It’s a Different Business Model
Most brands treat Q‑commerce like a faster version of e‑commerce: same assortment, same pricing logic, same monthly planning cadence. That approach almost always fails.
India’s Q‑commerce is dark‑store‑led and hyperlocal, with thousands of small, high‑velocity nodes rather than a few central warehouses. Blinkit alone is estimated to operate 1,000+ dark stores across 100+ cities, with industry projections of 5,000–5,500 dark stores across players by FY 26. These stores are designed to maximise sell‑through per square foot, not your brand’s catalogue depth.
Example: Same brand, two different “businesses”
• On Amazon: A beverage brand might run 18 SKUs—multiple flavours, sizes, and combo packs to drive basket building and brand exploration.
• On Q‑commerce: The same brand will usually get 3–5 high‑velocity SKUs listed per dark store, because the platform optimises for pick speed, order density, and contribution margin per pick slot, not range.
BrandPort POV: Brands that win don’t “add” Q‑commerce to their channel mix. They design for it separately, with a clear understanding of speed, space constraints, and repeat behaviour at a dark‑store level.
POV #2: Assortment Width Kills Performance in Q-commerce
Many founders believe, “If I launch more SKUs, my visibility will increase.” In Q‑commerce, the opposite is usually true.
Platforms are ruthless about SKU productivity. Low‑velocity SKUs depress overall efficiency, drive wastage in perishable categories, and reduce contribution margin from each dark store’s limited shelf space.
What we typically see across brands
• Wide assortments dilute shelf priority: Stores stock one facing each of 12 flavours instead of giving 3–4 fast‑moving SKUs the depth they need.
• Low‑velocity SKUs get deprioritised: Once a SKU drops below minimum weekly sales thresholds, replenishment slows and the algorithm deprioritises it.
• Poor sell‑through leads to delisting pressure: Over a 4–8 week window, platforms nudge brands to prune non‑performing SKUs or face higher visibility costs.
Example: Narrow launch, wider scale
A snacking brand entering Zepto with 3 SKUs (one hero flavour, one classic, one premium) across 150 dark stores can target 10–15 units per SKU per store per week, building a strong velocity story. Once the top 2 SKUs consistently hit that mark for 6–8 weeks, the brand can justify adding a 4th or 5th variant to selected high‑performing stores, not to the entire network.
BrandPort POV: Q‑commerce success starts with assortment discipline. High‑performing brands launch with a narrow, data‑backed SKU set then expand only when velocity justifies it. In Q‑commerce, focus scales faster than variety.
